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Abstract
What are the similarities and the differences between the failed constitution-making enterprise 
of the left-wing coalition (1994-1998) and the enactment of the Basic Law of Hungary by the right-
wing parties (2011-2012)? In my paper, I argue that there is a fundamental difference of political 
visions underlying the failure of the first enterprise and the controversial nature of the other: the 
socialists and the liberals represented a consensualist vision of politics that was the heritage of the 
political culture of the Kádár-regime and the democratic transition; the right-wing coalition, on the 
contrary,  stressed  a  conflictual  vision.  The  failure  of  the  first  enterprise  was  a  result  of  the 
weakening of the political culture of political consensus: though no one dared to explicitly refute a 
consensual way of constitution-making yet, but the rightist parties only half-heartedly participated 
in the procedure. By contrast to this, the success of the second was a by-product of the qualified 
(two-thirds)  majority of the right-wing parties representing a conflictualist  political  style  in  the 
parliament rather than a result of a capacity (let alone a design) to create a non-partisan agreement 
on the issue. In my paper, I will describe these two visions, their origins, and their influence on the 
outcomes of the constitution-making debates.    
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to give an interpretation of the aborted constitution-making enterprise 
that was initiated and worked on under the socialist-liberal government between 1994 and 1998. I 
assert that this failed constitution-making process was based on a consensualist vision of politics1 
that prevailed in Hungary during and immediately after the democratic transition, and its fate was 
determined by the decline and fall of this vision. The origins of this consensualism can be traced 
back to the last decades of the communist rule, and played a role in the consolidation of the Kádár-
regime as well as in its peaceful dissolution. The early grand-scale societal, economic and political 
reforms of the democratic transition were also due to the consensus of the political and professional 
elites.  We  have  enough  documentary  evidence  to  think  that  the  promoters  of  the  1994-1998 
constitution-making  process  understood  their  motion  as  a  mere  continuation  (what  is  more  a 
symbolic consummation) of the transition process.2  
1 The term ’vision of politics’ I borrowed from the title of Quentin Skinner’s book (Quentin Skinner: Visions of Politics. 
Vols. 1-3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006.) but without any claim to apply his conceptual apparatus in 
this analysis. I may just as well use ’political outlook’ or ’understanding of politics’ etc.. What is important in this 
respect is that consensualism was a principle underlying the political reasoning in a great deal of very different cases.
2 For example, the socialist MP, Zoltán Gál who was the chair of the Constitution-drafting Committee, said: „As it is 
known, the preparatory work on the codification of a new constitution which would construct a modern, democratic 
state based on the rule of law had begun already in the 1980s. The laws that made the political regime change possible 
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As is well known, Hungary was one of the two East-Central European countries that did not 
draft  an  entirely  new  constitution  during  the  democratic  transition.3 The  rewriting  of  the  old 
constitution  was  a  deliberate  strategy  followed  by  the  opposition  parties  when  they  made  an 
agreement with the communist party at the roundtable talks. What they intended to do was to lay 
down the politico-legal foundations of the democratic transition, not to build a new democratic 
regime.4 They had at least two reasons to do so. First, it was the best way to avoid giving too much  
concession to the communists. (The Polish example seemed to teach them that lesson.) Second, they 
felt that they did not have legitimacy enough to make the final arrangements of the democratic  
polity.5 A series of modifications in the old constitution (although, in the course of the roundtable 
talks, the number of changes grew so high that in reality only some sentences were preserved of the  
original text) seemed the best way to guarantee the democratic transition without constraining the 
freedom of action of the future democratic legislation.6    
The preamble of the rewritten constitution declared its transitional character, saying that ‘For 
the sake of promoting the peaceful political transition into state of the rule of law that would realize 
political  pluralism,  parliamentary  democracy,  and  social  market  economy,  the  Parliament 
established  the  text  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Hungarian  Republic  as  follows’.  Based  on  this 
intention  and  the  prevalence  of  a  consensualist  political  vision  during  the  early  1990s  it  was 
and received their content in the course of the roundtable talks were born. The political preconditions for the new 
constitution were still lacking. The agreement about the modification of the old constitution laid down the legal 
foundations for the peaceful transition into parliamentary democracy, social market economy, and the rule of law, and it 
provided a chance for the newly elected parliament after 1990 to draft a new constitution. However, the energies of the 
government were spent on the task of adjusting the whole legal system to the renewed constitution. Therefore, the 
making of the new constitution waits for the present Parliament. This task was considered important by all significant 
political parties as can be seen from the fact that all of them put the promise of a new constitution on their platforms.” 
(Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán eds.: Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 1994-
1998. Vol.1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998.  70)
3 Elster, Jon – Offe, Claus – Preuss, Ulrich K.: Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at  
Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998. 63-108. It was Andrew Arato who developed a theory of ’post 
sovereign constitution-making’ after the model of the Hungarian and Polish examples (Redeeming the Still Redeemable 
and Post Sovereign Constitution Making. Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society. Vol. 22. No.4. 427-443.).  
4 The metaphor of ‘alap’ (foundation) was often coined at the Roundtable Talks as the interpretation of the agreement 
between the communists and the opposition parties. See Szűcs, Zoltán Gábor: Az antalli pillanat: A nemzeti történelem 
szerepe a magyar politikai diskurzusban, 1989-1993. Budapest: L’Harmattan.  88.
5 This problem resurfaced when extreme right subcultures invented the conspiracy theory of a ’Rózsadomb pact’ as an 
alternative narrative of the democratic transition in which the USA, the Soviet Union, the Israeli and European powers 





1    
6 About the roundtable talks see Ripp, Zoltán: Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987-1990. Budapest: Napvilág. 2006; 
Bozóki, András: Politikai pluralizmus Magyarországon, 1987-2002. Budapest: Századvég. 2003; Bozóki András et al. 
eds.: A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve. Vols. 1-5. Budapest: Új Mandátum. 
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plausible to think that a new constitution should be written as soon as possible after the democratic 
transition, and that this new constitution should be accepted in a consensual manner. As we will see, 
the whole procedure of the 1994-98 constitution-making process was built on these principles, thus 
what its failure foreshadowed was the decline of the consensualist vision of politics. 
After  the  failure  of  the  1994-98 constitution-making enterprise,  the  issue of  constitution-
making became increasingly the expression of conflicting political identities. After the victory of a 
right-wing  coalition,  as  the  finished  constitution-draft  was  off  the  agenda,  the  whole  question 
became a cleavage-point between the governing coalition and the socialist-liberal opposition. The 
motion of the minor coalition party’s Minister of Justice to rename the old constitution from ‘Act 
XX of 1949’ to ‘Act I of 2000’ in order to do away with its uneasy origins was more than a mere  
technical issue. Rather it was a product of the ‘millenniarist’ rhetoric of the new government in 
which a moral-political renewal of Hungary was intertwined with the end of the 20 th century and the 
millennium of  Hungarian  statehood.7 As  this  moralizing  rhetoric  of  renewal  became a  kind  of 
benchmark of the Hungarian right, the socialists and the liberals started to call into question the 
necessity for making a new constitution.8 Interestingly, the socialist-liberal coalition, even after their 
gaining power in 2002, did not entail a return to the 1994-98 constitution-making process either. 
Instead, there occurred some faint attempts to begin the work afresh, but these soon died away as 
they became public.9 
What can explain the failure of these recent undertakings is the emergence of a new public 
discourse that asserted that the 1989 constitution was an entirely new one which, together with the 
constitutional  interpretations  of  the  Constitutional  Courts,  has  grown  into  one  of  the  most 
significant achievements of the new democratic polity. It was also a part of this discourse that there 
is no reason to make a new constitution; and if politicians insisted on constitution-making it would 
have been best to change the text of the current one as little as possible. Although this discourse 
infiltrated the socialist-liberal  parties as well,  it  was defended most fiercely by lawyers, among 
whom a number of par excellence conservative intellectuals played a prominent role, thus the name 
of a ‘conservative view of the constitution-making’ fits  this  discourse even better  than the one 
7 The minister, Ibolya Dávid said in a debate in 1999: ’ the reference to the Act XX of 1949 should be erased from the 
title of the constitution; we would like to replace the preamble that emphasized the transitionality with one that would 
be good enough for a thousand-year-old country; and the chapter about the fundamental rights should take its proper 
place in the structural system of the constitution’ (http://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?
p_ckl=36&p_uln=107&p_felsz=2&p_szoveg=%28%20alkotm%E1ny%20or%20szent%20istv%E1n
%20%29&p_felszig=2) 
8 But before that they made a last effort in 1999 to renew the 1994-98 constitution-making process. The motion was 
introduced by three socialist MP’s: György Wiener, a socialist MP and constitutional lawyer, Balázs Csákabonyi and 
Dezső Avarkeszi. (http://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_irom.irom_adat?p_ckl=36&p_izon=1838)  
9 For example, Minister of Justice, József Petrényi outlined a draft in 2006, but it was never discussed in public. Even 




between 1994 and 1998.10 
What  created  a  radically  new  situation  in  this  story  was  the  landslide  victory  of  the 
conservative-national parties in 201011 because the two-thirds majority of the new governing parties 
in the parliament set the choice before them either to keep themselves to the consensualist way of 
making a  new constitution  at  their  own discretion  or  to  open a  new chapter  in  the  history of 
Hungarian constitutionalism and draft a partisan constitution. After a short period of uncertainty, the 
coalition chose the  second way the result  of  which was a  heatedly debated  Basic  Law with a 
strongly ideological National Confession as an introduction of the text that came under especially 
harsh criticism.12 As a consequence, the constitution-making process was surrounded by unusually 
radical ideas on the part of the leftist intellectuals who openly discussed in public journals whether,  
after the fall of the national-conservative coalition if the new government had not the parliamentary 
majority needed to revoke the constitution, it would be possible to nullify the new Basic Law on the 
basis of its unconstitutionality or it should be done in a plebiscitary way.13 It goes without saying 
that these debates were clear expressions of the end of the age of consensualism, and were reactions 
to the renaissance of partisanship in the first decade of the new millennium.  
After  this  short  overview  of  a  great  transformation  of  Hungarian  political  thought  that 
underlay the change in opinions in the issue of constitution-making from the 1990s to the 2010s, it 
is time to restate the aim of the paper in a more detailed form. The aim is to trace the clues of the  
transformation focusing on the moment when the predominance of the consensualist vision began to 
decline. To show this process, the argument of my paper will be as follows:
1) the first section will give a short summary of the 1994-98 constitution-making enterprise;
2) the second section will analyze the arguments of the constitution-making debates from the 
perspective of consensualism; 
3) the third section will contrast the history of the birth of the Basic Law with the case of the  
1994-98 constitution-making enterprise.    
10 A monument of this veneration for the 1989-constitution was erected by a grandiose project initiated by László 
Sólyom (a former chair of the Constitutional Court and later the President of the Hungarian Republic) and coordinated 
by András Jakab that was published in a two-volume form of ‘Az alkotmány kommentárja’ (Budapest: Századvég, 2009) 
by the Századvég publishing house, a right-wing think-tank, in 2009. The project involved the collaboration of about. 
50 constitutional lawyers and attempted to plant German legal genres into the Hungarian juristic discourse. Ironically, 
the work lost its momentum the moment it was published.  
11 The best political science analysis of the elections is provided by Enyedi, Zsolt – Szabó, Andrea – Tardos, Róbert 
(eds.): Új képlet: A 2010-es választások Magyarországon. Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja 
Alapítvány. 2011. 
12 The National Confession was analyzed by the conservative political philosopher, Ferenc Horkay Hörcher in a 
somewhat apologetic manner in Horkay Hörcher, Ferenc:  A Nemzeti hitvallásról. In: Jakab, András – Körösényi, 
András (eds.): Alkotmányozás Magyarországon és máshol. Budapest: MTA TK PTI – Új Mandátum. 2012. 287-309.
13 In 2011, mostly the popular weekly of the liberal intelligentsia, Élet és irodalom, provided space for these discussions 
of which the most prominent contributors were the Eötvös Károly Közpolitikai Intézet led by the former ombudsman, 
László Majtényi, Mátyás Eörsi, a former liberal MP, Viktor Szigetvári, a former spin doctor of the socialist prime 
ministers,  Csaba Tordai, a constitutional lawyer and a former state secretary at the Office of the Prime Minister etc.. 
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1. The events of the 1994-98 constitution-making
The consensualist intention of the 1994-98 constitution-making enterprise was evident even 
from the  government’s  program.  This  document  declared  that  ‘in  order  to  finish  the  political 
transition, create national consensus, and lay the foundations for the stability of constitutionalism, 
the government is committed to making a new constitution. The drafting will be brought about 
through  extensive  professional  and  public  debates,  by  drawing  lessons  from  domestic  and 
international legal studies and the developments of modern states. The procedures will be built on 
the broadest possible national consensus to enforce the social acceptance of the constitution’.14 
According to  the original  schedule,  the  government  planned to end the  procedure  with a 
referendum in the second half of 1995. At that time, it was also presumed that the Minister of 
Justice  will  coordinate  the  work,  and  he  set  out  to  arrange  the  procedure  by  establishing  a 
Secretariat for the Preparation of the Constitution within the Ministry of Justice and officially asked 
for the professional contribution of the Legal Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences to the 
work.  The  result  of  this  work  was  almost  a  hundred  studies  discussing  various  parts  of  the 
constitutional agenda as well  as two comprehensive conceptions for the future constitution: the 
conception  of  the  Legal  Institute  was  elaborated  by  András  Bragyova  (later  a  judge  of  the 
Constitutional Court), while the conception of the Ministry was authored by a committee of eight 
experts.  After  the  cabinet  had  accepted  the  report  of  the  minister  in  March 1995,  a  period  of 
domestic and international consultations started ranging from the MP’s of the coalition parties to 
civic society, professional organizations, and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.15 
Despite this seemingly unproblematic progress, the parliamentary process seldom proceeded. 
The parliament decided only in May 1995 to establish a committee for the preparation of the new 
constitution that gave equal representation from each parliamentary party, and regulated the process 
of constitution-making. The regulation included strong restrictions on the legislative influence of 
the governing parties that had a two-thirds – constitutional – majority when requiring a four-fifths 
majority in the Parliament to accept the principles of the new constitution, and required a five-sixths 
majority within the committee for the preparation of the new constitution.  
The committee began work on 5 October 1995, and it soon set aside the materials of the 
Ministry, starting the whole job afresh. This was a decision that, as it turned out later, proved fatal to 
the cause of constitution-making. When the parliamentary committee, after a long and complicated 
debate, introduced its proposal about the principles of the new constitution to the Parliament in 
14 Somogyvári István: Alkotmányozás Magyarországon, 1994-1998. in: Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): 
Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for 
Parliamentary Management. 1998. 20. (the emphases were added by me)
15 A difference that stands out when compared to the process of the preparation of the Basic Law. 
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March  1996,  the  schedule  included  the  date  of  final  voting  on  the  proposal  as  3  July  1996. 
However,  the final voting was prolonged for a considerably long time, since the voting on the 
modifications of the proposal on 27 June 1996 had ended with an astonishing result: some members 
of the cabinet voted against the proposal (supposedly, it happened because they were reported by 
the Minister of Justice16 that the proposal of the committee contained unacceptable terms) and this 
fact was interpreted by the opposition parties as an open violation of the preliminary agreements.
It came as no surprise that, after this incident, the opposition parties did not want to continue 
the  constitution-making  process  or  return  to  the  table.  It  took  until  September  1996  for  he 
discussions to  reopen.  Although, on 17 December,  the Parliament  accepted the proposal  of  the 
committee,  and  authorized  it  to  elaborate  the  text  of  the  constitution  until  March  1997,  the 
constitution-making gradually became a lost cause: in March 1997, the committee still did not set 
about its new work; and it took one more year to complete the task and draft a text that contained 43 
textual alternatives at various points. By then, because the Parliament finished its work on 16 March 
1998, all the parties agreed that the draft should not even be introduced to the house, let alone be 
discussed.
Some might argue that the failure of the acceptance of the principles of the new constitution 
in June 1996 entailed only a short pause in the process, thus we should not accept without further 
consideration the opposition’s interpretation of the events and say that it was the cabinet’s fault that  
the constitution was never enacted. For example, it was said that on 27 June 1996, if the opposition 
MPs were present in larger numbers, the failure of the voting would have been avoided. Still, it 
remains  a  fact  beyond  doubt  that  the  result  of  the  voting  opened  a  great  opportunity  for  the 
opposition to slow the whole process down and successfully accuse the government of violating 
their own promises.  
         
2. The ‘conservatism’ of the 1994-98 constitution-making
This is the history of the ‘abortion of the conservative constitution-making’ in a nutshell. We 
saw already that the socialist-liberal coalition was really stuck to a consensualist vision of politics: 
in vain did they have a constitutional majority and they started a constitution-making on the basis of 
‘national consensus’, ‘professional and public consultations’, and constitutional restrictions on their 
own power. We can even catch the moment of hybris on the part of the socialists: it occurred when 
their Minister of Justice counseled the cabinet to derail the consensual procedure. 
The  ‘conservatism’ of  the  enterprise  came  from  its  consensualism.  One  can  imagine  a 
situation where a national consensus is needed for a radical reform, but the 1994-98 constitution-
16 The minister was obviously frustrated by the loss of control over the constitution-making process, as it was later 
confirmed informally to me by Mihály Bihari, the former socialist member of the parliamentary committee.
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making procedure was not of that kind. That was intended to finish the political transition and ‘put 
the icing on the cake’, and since the Hungarian political transition was supposed to be a gradual and 
not a revolutionary one, the new constitution had to be continuous with the rewritten old text. This 
commitment  to  the  continuity was  expressed  in  the  regulation  of  the  parliamentary committee 
saying that the old text should be retained where there was no consensus about a new version.
The ‘conservatism’ of the constitution-making was recurrently highlighted by the participants 
of the public debates. For example, a liberal MP, Péter Hack said that it was time to complete the 
new constitution  because  the  ‘process  of  the  conservative  constitution-making  reached  a  point 
during  recent  years  from  which  there  is  no  reason  to  continue  further  discussions  of  certain 
questions’.17 Similarly, the socialist MP, Mihály Bihari mentioned the ‘need for legal continuity’ in 
the  course  of  constitution-making.18 The  MP of  the  opposition  party Fidesz,  József  Szájer  (the 
author of the 2010 Basis Law) also said that ‘there is no need to change the foundations of the 
democratic institutions as they were established in 1989 and 1990. In this sense, the Fidesz wants a 
conservative constitution.’19 The independent MP, László Salamon, who was formerly a member of 
the conservative MDF and later became a leading politician of the Fidesz, emphasized that the most 
important advantage of the current constitution-making is its conservative nature. As he said: ‘It’s 
good that the authors of the principles of the new constitution resisted the temptation of l’art pour 
l’art innovating’20 Finally, we should mention that the term became so common that it was coined 
even  when  someone  wanted  to  criticize  the  whole  undertaking.  For  example,  the  Christian 
Democrat MP Miklós Gáspár stated that the ‘model of a liberal state’ underlying the conception of 
the new constitution cannot be accepted because it is designed to ‘preserve an unjust and unhealthy 
societal structure for the future’.21       
Put differently, the constitution-making was to be built on the grounds of ‘national consensus’ 
and  a  ‘conservative’  attitude  towards  the  already  existing  democratic  polity.  This  kind  of 
consensualism  was  not  without  precedent  in  Hungarian  politics.  On  the  contrary,  the  idea  of 
consensual legislation and cautious changes was strongly supported by the system of the so-called 
17 Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 81.
18 Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 94.
19 Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 103. His speech is especially interesting 
from our perspective because it mostly articulated the Fidesz’s commitment to certain constitutional values and used a 
martial rhetoric as if it were his (as well as his party’s) urgent task to stand up for values endangered by the socialist-
liberal cabinet, but otherwise the speech discussed the same themes as the other speeches. The combative and lofty 
rhetoric and the content of the speech were in obvious contradiction and demonstrated the beginning of the decline of 
the politics of consensus.
20 Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 118.
21 Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 174.
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‘two-thirds majority’ laws that in a normal case would need the cooperation of the governing parties 
and the opposition. For this reason, governments were regularly forced to reach a consensus even in 
cases where they originally held the initiative: in 1990, the government had to rewrite its proposal 
concerning  the  local  governments  when  it  was  faced  with  a  strong  opposition22;  in  1996,  the 
Parliament passed a law on media on a consensual basis that was designed to close a series of 
heated debates about governmental influence over the mass-media (a period of which was even 
termed ‘Kulturkampf’). What was peculiar in the case of the 1994-98 constitution-making was that 
it  proved a failure of consensualism so complete and persistent that cannot be compared to any 
other issues in Hungarian politics.23  
Why did it happen?  A possible answer could begin by stating the fact that the socialist-liberal  
coalition lost the 1998 elections and a coalition of the former right-wing opposition parties led by 
Viktor Orbán succeeded them, and it seems plausible to say that the right-wing forces opposed the 
whole constitution-making process as it had been conducted by the socialist-liberal parties, and that 
the right-wing parties also opposed the text which had been outlined in this process. Although this 
explanation  has  its  merits24,  it  cannot  explain  the  striking  contradiction  between  the  early 
descriptions of the constitution-making process as a 'conservative' or a consensual one on the part of 
the governing parties and the refutation of the 1994-1998 constitution by the former opposition as a 
socialist – liberal partisan project. 
There should be something more here than merely the succession of power from one political 
coalition  to  another.  During  the  constitution-making  process,  rightist  politicians  (especially  the 
Fidesz and MDF) cooperated with the majority and their objections against the process were limited 
to such questions as: why is it so important to draft a new constitution just now?25 Or: do they have 
enough time to finish the process before the 1998 elections etc.? Even if we can recognize the signs  
22 Szűcs, Zoltán Gábor: Az antalli pillanat: A nemzeti történelem szerepe a magyar politikai diskurzusban, 1989-1993. 
Budapest: L’Harmattan. 147-162.
23 Interestingly, the 1996 media law also did not put an end to the political conflicts around the mass-media. After 1998, 
it was the socialist and liberal parties who became the proponents of the need for a better regulation because of the 
apparent political abuses of the law on the part of the national-conservative parties. Those who originally initiated the 
1996 law became the most committed critics because of the large number of its errors and loopholes, and it was the 
national-conservative coalition that unilaterally made a new regulation in 2010. In a sense, we can say that the fate of 
these motions needing government-opposition cooperation and initiated between 1994 and 1998 is the best indicator of 
the decline and fall of consensualism. However, the success of passing the media law and the failure of the constitution-
making are stories that cannot be equated without risking to overlook the exceptional significance of the constitution-
making process.    
24 It is a known fact that the term ’alkotmányozás’ (constitution-making) emerges only twelve times in the official 
records of the Parliament between 1998 and 2002. Moreover, it was usually the opposition that coined it.   
25 For example, the Christian Democrat MP, Tamás Isépy claimed that ’we must not speak of any ’state of emergency’ in 
the point of constitution-making’ (Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő  
munkájának dokumentumai, 1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 99). Similarly, 
József Szájer, quoted LászlóTrócsányi’s words: ’the Hungarian public legal traditions oblige the constitution-makers to 
proceed with necessary self-restraint and consideration in the course of drafting the new constitution that would embody 
the national consensus’ (Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő 
munkájának dokumentumai, 1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 105).   
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of a kind of resentment against the possibility of successfully making a new constitution under the 
rule of a socialist – liberal coalition, we cannot find expressed refusals of the whole enterprise in the 
documents. The only moment when they used a radical rhetoric against the constitution making was 
the  above-mentioned  defeat  of  the  proposal  about  the  principles  and  structure  of  the  future 
constitution. The reaction to this surprising failure was almost hysterical: rightist politicians spoke 
about  the 'betrayal  of  consensual  politics'  and also about  the 'appearance of  the true nature'  of 
socialists.26 And, as we saw already, it took months until they returned to the constitution making 
discussions. 
This lack of explicit refusals of the legitimacy of the constitution-making before 1998 means 
that any later shift in the evaluation of the enterprise from a consensual to a partisan one needed 
either  to  ignore  the  procedural  guarantees  of  the  constitution-making  or  to  debunk  the  hidden 
political maneuvers of the socialist-liberal coalition behind the curtains of a seemingly consensual 
procedure. What right-wing politicians really presented when they were confronted with the fate of 
the 1994-1998 constitution-making process was a mixture of suggestions and intimations, but there 
was no elaborate discussion of the issue. But what is also striking is that they never initiated a new 
constitution-making procedure between 1998 and 2002 that could have proved more 'consensual' or 
'conservative' (in the above-mentioned sense of the word) than the 1994-1998 process. Rather, as 
we also saw, they said something like 'now is not the time to make a new constitution' and later 
merely proposed to change the name of the old constitution from Act XX of 1949 to  Act I of 2000. 
This strategy of reticence on the part of the right-wing coalition that can be well contrasted 
with their  otherwise radical rhetoric of overall  societal  and political  changes27 suggests that the 
criteria  of 'consensus'  and 'conservatism'  (in  the above-mentioned sense of  the word) lost  their 
legitimizing  power  after  the  fall  of  the  socialist  -  liberal  coalition.  Had  it  not  happened,  the  
governing parties presumably could not have chosen other than to continue the constitution-making.
This suggestion can also be underpinned by the events of the last months when a qualified 
majority of the right-wing coalition that returned to power after 8 years of opposition and was led 
again by Viktor Orbán drafted a new constitution without any substantive contribution from the 
26 For example, the Fidesz’s MP, János Áder said in an obviously irritated manner shortly after the voting: ’’[the 
socialists] broke the consensus, the attempt to make a consensual constitution as we had agreed eight months ago.’ 
(Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 758.) The Christian Democrat MP, Tamás 
Isépy asked: ’I am asking now: who did break the agreement?’ (Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az 
Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary 
Management. 1998. 759.) Imre Kónya, an MP of the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party: ’It is without precedent that 
it was the government that is responsible for the stability that broke the agreement’ (Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, 
Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center 
for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 760.) Ervin Demeter, an MP of the Hungarian Democrats:’ In our opinion, this 
situation has no precedent, and it questions the sincerity of the intentions [of the government] and of the governing 
majority.’ (Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának 
dokumentumai, 1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 761.)
27 One of their most popular slogans was ’More than a change of government, less than a change of system’ in 1998.
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leftist parties, and they legitimized their actions by reference to their two-thirds majority in the 
Parliament as a direct mandate. They also described their constitution-making enterprise as a part of 
the so-called 'revolution of the poll booths'. And it goes without saying that a 'consensus' of political 
elites or any sort of 'conservatism' are not of much use in the course of a 'revolution'.      
But how can we account for the apparent discursive differences between the two constitution-
making processes, that is, for the differences between the 'conservative' and the 'revolutionary' one? 
I think that in this – both conceptual and political – change in Hungarian political thought there was 
much more at stake than rhetoric. What came about here was the fall of one kind of 'vision of 
politics' in which 'consensus' played a significant role and also the emergence of another vision in 
which  political  'consensus'  is  downplayed and the  struggle  of  conflicting  values  is  emphasized 
instead.
It is important to emphasize that ‘consensus’ was clearly a normative ideal of the political 
debates, not a really existing political practice. Indeed it was a key concept that assumed a number 
of  different  meanings  ranging  from  the  classical  notion  of  ‘shared  common  values’ to  mere 
‘agreement’ or ‘compromise’ between different standpoints, but what was always its asymmetric 
counter-concept was ‘conflict’. In the early 1990s, no politicians dared to speak about substantial 
differences of perspectives in politics and to recognize their equivalence or at least the inerasability 
of the differences. Even the liberals supposed the unity of the foundations of the polity or, if not,  
they condemned the other perspectives as anti-democratic ones. Similarly, the right-wing politicians 
used the notion of political conflicts as a means of exclusion from the political community. 
By contrast to this, a growing sense of fundamental differences between the two poles of the 
political culture began to spread in Hungarian political discourse from the late 1990s. This process 
became manifest in the pillarization of the printed and electronic media, the decline and fall of 
technocratic ideals of policy-making, the emptying of the political center in the citizens’ political 
attitudes28, the stability of a bipolar party-system for more than a decade29. As a specific answer to 
this development the political parties recurrently initiated campaigns to reposition themselves from 
a  non-ideologically defined political  ‘center’ that  had  been so popular  hitherto  among them to 
ideologically distinct positions. For example, the socialists deployed the ‘let’s be leftists’ slogan 
(‘Merjünk  baloldalinak  lenni!’)  in  2006,  the  liberals  amended  the  name  of  Alliance  of  Free 
Democrats with ‘Hungarian Liberal Party’ in 2005, the leader of the MDF compiled a ‘conservative 
manifesto’ in 2004 etc.. It was a kind of ‘renaissance of politics’ in that all political actors turned 
28 Angelusz, Róbert –Tardos, Róbert: Régi és új törésvonalak, polarizáció, divergenciaspirál. Tardos, Róbert – Enyedi, 
Zsolt – Szabó, Andrea (eds.): Részvétel, képviselet, politikai változás. Budapest: Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Köz­
pontja Alapítvány, 2011, 347-382.
29 Enyedi, Zsolt –Benoit, Kenneth: Kritikus választás 2010. A magyar pártrendszer átrendeződése a bal–jobb dimenzió­
ban. Enyedi, Zsolt – Szabó, Andrea – Tardos- Róbert (eds.): Új képlet. Választások Magyarországon, 2010. Budapest: 
Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, 2011, 17-42. p.
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their attention to the role of disagreement in politics. 
From the middle of the 1990s the emergence of the new predominantly right-wing political 
party (Fidesz) played a prominent, though somewhat ambiguous role in this political renaissance. 
On the one hand, no other party pushed the consequences of the bipolar characteristic of Hungarian 
politics further than they did. There is a very strong continuity in the ‘us and them’ rhetoric of the  
Fidesz  from the  early  1990s  up  to  now.  This  rhetoric  always  emphasized  the  unsurmountable 
differences between the Hungarian left and right, it also presented parliamentary elections as an 
ultimate choice between two worlds, past and future, (post-)communists and patriots etc.. In this 
sense, Fidesz was a major promoter of the political renaissance. However, we should keep in mind 
that partisanship was certainly not described in the Fidesz’s rhetoric as a peaceful contest between 
equal adversaries, but as an asymmetric struggle between Good and Bad.30 Thus, on the other hand, 
this asymmetry (that can be compared to the asymmetric conceptualization of political struggles 
between Democrats and Anti-democrats in the leftist and liberal discourses of the day) meant that 
partisanship was not understood as an ideal state of political contest by them, but as a step towards 
the moral renewal of the political community on the basis of commonly shared values. As we will  
see later, the rhetoric of Fidesz can be understood as much a rhetoric of new national consensus as 
an apology of partisanship and conflict.       
The  consensualist  vision  of  the  early  1990s  was  a  complex  interplay  between  various 
discursive traditions.31 First, it was a direct consequence of the rhetoric of ‘national consensus’ of  
the late Kádár-regime that was transmitted to the new democratic regime by the peaceful process of 
political transition. After the 1956 revolution and the reprisals, the communist regime increasingly 
endeavored to base its rule on the expressed consent of the people. The incessant growth of social 
expenditure from the late 1960s, cautious reform policies around 1968 and later in the late 1970s, 
the  lack  of  open  political  repressions,  the  propagation  of  a  ‘welfare  nationalism’ against  the 
national-communism of some of the neighboring communist regimes, the increasing dissociation of 
private individualism and public ideology, the popular cult of János Kádár as a puritan leader who 
hates  any  Stalinist-kind  ‘cult  of  personality’  etc.  were  all  means  of  creating  this  ‘national 
consensus’.  Second,  although  the  Marxist  grounds  of  the  public  discourse  could  never  be 
30 E.g. Vikor Orbán said in the campaign in 2002: „Still our life is something more than merely a struggle for survival. 
And it is this something more that makes our life really beautiful; it is this that really matters.” 
http://www.erdonline.hu/portal.aspx/document/show/81474237-2801-45b0-abca-4b683137f072  
31 Although, in the following, I will emphasize the emancipatory and dissident features of the consensual vision of 
politics within the Hungarian context, we should not overlook the increasingly consensualist and conservative 
undertones of the late Kádár-regime because this latter fact also contributed to the persistent popularity of the ideas of 
consensus and cautious reforms. The term ‘nemzeti konszenzus’ (national consensus) was coined in official documents 
at least from the 1970s and the symbolic politics of the communist regime began to return to the conservative traditions 
of the Hungarian political thought (especially to the person of count István Széchenyi, a hero of the 19th century liberal 
nationalist reform movement as well as an idol of the ultra-conservative Horthy-regime in the 20th century) as it was 
uncovered by the dissident historian, Miklós Szabó in a series of excellent essays (Szabó, Miklós: Politikai kultúra 
Magyarországon, 1896-1986. Budapest: Medvetánc. 1986.).
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questioned  without  risking  oppressive  responses,  and  Marxism  remained  the  only  legitimate 
ideological language in the publicity (apart from some nationalistic undertones), at least from the 
1970s there began a kind of re-institutionalization of originally non-Marxist or 'bourgeois' social, 
legal and economic sciences.32 And, as a side-effect of this development, alternative – technocratic 
– descriptions of the political reality appeared in the public sphere, and the monopoly of the Marxist 
regime in the interpretation of the society, economy and polity turned into a silent struggle between 
the ideological and 'professional' discourses. In the professional discourses of the 1970s and 1980s, 
a number of politically sensitive issues came under discussion from demographic problems to class 
differences and poverty in a socialist  country and on to a superiority of market over economic 
planning.  In  a  certain  sense,  the  result  of  this  phenomenon  was  a  pluralisation  of  the  public 
discourse, but the relationship between 'ideology' and 'expertism' step-by-step developed into a total 
refusal of ideology and an anti-political rhetoric of expertism. It is more than a mere coincidence 
that  the  last  communist  cabinet  declared  itself  independent  from  the  communist  party  as  a 
'government of experts' in 1989. Partly, it could have happened because it was a logical way of 
interpreting  the  decline  and  fall  of  the  communist  regime  in  the  form  of  a  narrative  of  the 
emancipation of Reality (as it is described and explained by the experts) under the oppression of the 
Ideology. At this point, the discourse of technocracy became necessarily mingled with the Western, 
liberal narrative of the ‘end of history’, the discourse of liberal democracy and neo-liberal economic 
policies. In this sense, technocracy conceptualized ‘consensus’ as based on historical necessities, 
universal truths, and professional knowledge. Ironically, the Reality of the experts was a typical 
counter-product  of  Marxism:  it  was  a  Reality  in  which  economy still  determined  the  societal 
superstructure,  but  the  Market  proved  better  than  Soviet-type  economic  Planning.  Still, 
paradoxically, any political voluntarism was judged as a mere ideological illusion if compared to 
the  expertism-based policy-making,  because  voluntarism and economic  planning were  different 
sides of the same coin. The same applies to expertism and the refusal of statism. In this vision, 
politicians had to be deprived of agency in political processes and they had to be orientated by 
experts. Third, the various opposition groups of the Kádár-regime had a very strong anti-political  
incentive that  included  an  asymmetrical  conceptualization  of  open-minded  discussion  and 
consensus  against  partisanship  and  conflicts.  This  anti-political  incentive  was  manifest  in  the 
uncertainties both by the national-populist and the democratic opposition groups as to whether they 
should found parties as well as their choice of names for their movements. The national party was 
named ‘forum’ and the liberal was named ‘alliance’ in the end. It comes as no surprise that anti-
32 This development was analyzed in-depth by a handful of books as, among others, Becskeházi, Attila – Kuczi, Tibor: 
Valóság’70. Budapest: Scientia Humana. 1992; Csizmadia, Ervin: Diskurzus és diktatúra. Budapest: Századvég. 2001.; 
Körösényi, András: Értelmiség, politikai gondolkodás és kormányzat. Budapest: Osiris. 2000. For a broader Eastern 
European contextualization of this question see: Aligica, Paul Dragos – Evans, Anthony J.: The Neoliberal Revolution 
in Eastern Europe: Economic Ideas in the Transition from Communism. Cheltenham – Northampton: Edward Elgar.   
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politics with its consensualist ideal remained present in the democratic political discourse as well. 
Fourth, there is an underlying tradition of ‘compromise’ of the Hungarian political culture33 from the 
early modern age. The most famous examples of this cult of compromise are the compromises that 
ended the Rákóczi rebellion (in 1711), and the 1848-49 War of Independence (as late as 1867). 
Moreover, the early modern Hungarian parliamentarianism was a mechanism of discussion between 
the  nation  (the  Estates)  and  the  king,  and  the  acts  of  the  early  modern  parliament  were 
conceptualized as compromises between the two parties. This mechanism was termed ‘tractatus 
dieatalis’. Thus it can be argued that making compromises played a prominent role in the Hungarian 
political  culture,  and  this  traditionally  positive  evaluation  of  compromises  was  symbolically 
exploited in the Roundtable talks as well where the example of Ferenc Deák, the main author of the  
1867 compromise was often recalled. Similarly, compromise was a central piece of József Antall’s 
political  thought  and was expressed usually in historical  terms. Since he was the leader  of the 
Forum of  Hungarian Democrats  and the first  prime minister  after  the democratic  elections,  his 
specific understanding of compromise-centered political practice played its part in the Hungarian 
politics of the early 1990s.
Of these traditions,  the  technocratic  discourse was of  utmost  importance in  constitutional 
issues. To mention just one example, an opposition politician said during the 1994-98 constitution-
making  discussions:  'fortunately,  constitutional  lawyers  already determined  exactly  what  role  a 
constitution has, so we do not have to think about it.'34 Put differently, the standard argument in the 
1994-98 debate was a technocratic one.  It  supposed that  constitution-making is  the business of 
constitutional lawyers. As a consequence political consensus is always possible in these issues - at  
least  in  theory  -  because  every  political  problem  is  supposed  to  have  a  certain  rational  and 
professionally grounded solution.  While  consensus  is  always  possible,  the  reasons  for  political 
disagreement  are  of  a  merely  ideological  or  tactical  nature.  However,  constitution-making  is 
undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  important  political  issues,  thus  every  egoistic,  ideological  party 
interest  had to  be subjected to  the interests  of  making a  proper  constitution.  In short,  political 
consensus implied to be a symbolic expression of the lack of any serious political alternatives to 
liberal democracy.35          
Those who stayed outside the consensus risked their legitimacy in the world of democratic 
33 Cf. Péter, László: Elbától keletre. Budapest: Osiris. 1998.
34Somogyvári, István – Kisfaludy, Zoltán (eds.): Az Országgyűlés Alkotmány-előkészítő munkájának dokumentumai, 
1994-1998. Vol. 1. Budapest: Center for Parliamentary Management. 1998. 96
35 A similar situation can be observed in the rhetoric of the East-Central European constitutional courts. These courts 
used a ’moral realist’ rhetoric when speaking about human rights, and put strong constraints on the freedom of action of 
the legislation and the executive branch. Some even argued that this ’democracy by judiciary’ (to coin Kim Lane 
Scheppele’s term) was not only by definition anti-democratic, but also had serious negative effects on the democratic 
education of the political actors of new democracies because both the politicians and the citizens began to see 
constitutional courts as arbiters of all the ’sensitive’ political issues. See Wojciech Sadurski: Rights before courts. 
Dordrecht: Springer 2005.  
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politics  as  'demagogues'  or  'anti-democratic'  politicians,  so  those  who  did  not  want  a  new 
constitution were forced to accept the consensus as the rule of the democratic game and to present 
themselves as seeking consensus. Some parts of the right-wing opposition chose the first way, but 
the  Fidesz  picked the second one,  and I  argue  that  this  choice can account  for  their  strangely 
ambivalent attitudes toward the constitution making process. Until 1998, the right-wing opposition 
did not have the discursive means to challenge the consensual vision of democratic politics, thus 
they had to take their part in the constitution making, even if they did not wish to.
On the other hand, the consensualist vision provided some arguments against making a new 
constitution between 1994 and 1998 as well. Hungary had a constitution after 1989, and it was 
based on the consensus of the parties that were present at the Roundtable Talks. Moreover, the re-
writing of the text of the communist constitution established a liberal democratic polity, and none of 
the political actors doubted its liberal democratic features. Since the rhetoric of expertism usually 
suggested that every political problem has only one right solution, any changes in the institutional 
settings  of  the  liberal  democratic  polity  would  need  detailed  argumentation  and  very  careful 
consideration. It was the main reason for the self-description of the constitution making process as a 
'conservative' one.  They had to emphasize that making a new constitution would not threaten the 
democratic values of the post-1989 polity. Ironically, the right-wing opposition, that perhaps did not 
like the whole process, could only exploit this need for careful consideration in its rhetoric before 
1998 when trying to slow the discussions down.         
I think, the failed constitution making between 1994 and 1998 was the last great enterprise 
that  was to  be legitimized in the language of  this  commonly shared set  of political  principles, 
concepts  and  rhetoric.  After  1998,  the  new  government  tried  to  systematically  undermine  the 
validity of this vision of politics and replace it with a conflictual vision of politics.   
2011 Basic Law as a conflictual vision of politics
The shift of political visions was a slow process that came about almost unnoticed. Although 
the novelties of the politics represented by the Fidesz were detected and criticized by the liberal and 
leftist  intellectuals  from the late  1990s as  symptoms of  political  cynicism,  the emergence  of  a 
broader intellectual perspective received much less attention. It was only some marginal figures like 
the famous, but lonely neo-Marxist philosopher, Gáspár Miklós Tamás who supposed the existence 
of a system of ideas and attitudes behind the politics of the Fidesz36, but the others were stuck to the 
problems  of  how sincere  or  cynical  the  behavior  of  the  Fidesz  was.  Meanwhile,  a  number  of 
isolated, but parallel developments signaled the decline of consensualism.37 To mention just a few 
36 Tamás, Gáspár Miklós: Új osztálypolitika. Mozgó Világ. 1999. 1. 15-33.
37 Szűcs, Zoltán Gábor: A magyar politikai diskurzus változásai 2000 óta. In: Körösényi, András – Boda, Zsolt: Trendek 
a magyar politikában. (in prep)
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examples: the evaluation of the stabilizing economic policies of the socialist Minister of Finance, 
Lajos Bokros (1995-96), became a cleavage-point between leftist and rightist economists: what was 
adored as an unorthodox, still neo-liberal masterpiece of policy-making by the left, was criticized as 
a  mistake  that  had  devastating  effects  on  the  Hungarian  economy;  in  political  science,  the 
functionalist paradigm of the 1980s was replaced by various schools most of which were interested 
in the effects of endogenous factors on politics; both in conservative and post-modern intellectual 
circles, Carl Schmitt’s political theory had a momentum; there emerged a populous extreme right 
sub-culture with an alternative canon of Hungarian history and literature, and a racist discourse of 
political  incorrectness.  Put  bluntly,  the  conflictual  rhetoric  of  the  Fidesz  was  as  much  a  mere 
symptom of a broader intellectual change as a reason for the restructuring of Hungarian political 
discourse.                
From this perspective, the making of the 2011 Basic Law was a logical consequence of the 
change  of  political  visions,  but  even  my  interpretation  might  offer  a  somewhat  misleading 
reconstruction of the story, because the 'revolutionary' self-description of the right-wing government 
in 2010 and 2011 was actually a coincidence of two different strands of the political discourse. First, 
the political behavior of the right-wing parties was based on their bias towards specific political 
values  which they interpreted as  a  reason to  exclude the  possibility of  any consensual  way of 
making a new constitution, but it did not suggest a ‘revolutionary’ constitutional change in itself. In 
fact, some people were rather surprised when the Fidesz declared that they wanted to make a new 
constitution in 2010 because it was not explicitly part of their campaign and other issues might have 
seemed  more  important  from  an  outsider's  viewpoint.  Second,  when  Fidesz  won  a  qualified 
majority in the Parliament in 2010, it made it legally possible for them to radically change the 
constitution without the consent of any other political actors and implement their specific political 
values into the constitution, and it was immediately interpreted by them as a mandate to really bring 
about radical changes. As the future prime minister stated, ‘more votes would allow more radical 
changes’.  
Although opposition publicists emphasize the radical expansion of the power of the executive 
through the re-ordering of the constitutional relationship of the various institutions and through the 
extending of the right of appointment of the PM, these essentially sound criticisms are built on the 
present situation in which the government has an extraordinarily strong parliamentary support, and 
therefore these criticisms miss an important aspect of the making of the new constitution. As the 
right-wing rhetoric suggests, the 'revolution'  is intended to be an extraordinary moment in politics, 
a moment of re-founding of the polity, not a normal way of making politics, and the Basic Law is in 
reality full of institutional and procedural checks and balances to prevent a future government from 
exceeding the limits of the new constitution. It was explicitly stated by László Kövér, a prominent 
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leader of the Fidesz in the debate on the new constitution when he said that ‘[the new constitution] 
will be made not because of the two-thirds majority of the Fidesz and the Christian Democrats in  
the  Parliament,  but  because  it  is  the  first  time  that  a  minimal  consensus  of  values  –which  is 
indispensable for a successful future – has the opportunity to gain a two-thirds support from the 
elected representatives’38.  He also said that the main flaw in the construction of the democratic 
transition and the first two decades of the democratic politics was the assumption that there can be 
made a stable and meaningful democratic consensus between the former communists and all the 
other people. From this perspective, the new constitution has a twofold character. On the one hand, 
it is based on a conflictual vision of politics (a conflict between us and them). On the other hand, it 
is designed to become a firm legal foundation for a new political and moral consensus.39 
As a conclusion we can say that the 'revolution' tries to return to a kind of 'consensus' (if not 
in the present, but in the future), but this 'consensus' is not to be the same as the consensus of the 
extra-political  developments,  expertist  knowledge  and  the  'end  of  history'  of  the  1994-1998 
constitution  making  enterprise.  Rather,  it  would  be  a  consensus  of  a  political  community  of 
exclusive values.                      
38 h  ttp://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?
p_ckl=39&p_uln=76&p_felsz=13&p_szoveg=&p_felszig=13 
39 Certainly, we have reasons to have but little trust in this self-interpretation: the legislative practice of the national-
conservative cabinet was criticized fiercely by international organizations, the European Union as well as a number of 
various legal experts from Kim Lane Scheppele to László Sólyom and Gábor Halmai.
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